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				Justice Douglas 
				
				o   
				
				A 
				State violates the Equal Protection Clause whenever it makes the 
				affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
				standard. 
				
				  
				
				
				State Arg - Can demand poll tax for voting 
				
				o   
				
				
				It is argued that a State may exact fees from citizens for many 
				different kinds of licenses; that if it can demand from all an 
				equal fee for a driver's license, it can demand from all an 
				equal poll tax for voting.  
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Power is limited to fix qualification. 
				
				o   
				
				
				But we must remember that the interest of the State, when it 
				comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications.
				 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to voting 
				
				o   
				
				
				Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's 
				ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.
				 
				
				o   
				
				
				Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of 
				race ( Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216), are 
				traditionally disfavored.  
				
				
				Wealth or polltax is an irrelevant factor 
				
				o   
				
				
				To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a 
				voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or 
				irrelevant factor. 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Equal Protection treatments change 
				
				o   
				
				
				Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the 
				Equal Protection Clause do change. 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Skinner - 
				Classifications might invade or restrain 
				
				o   
				
				
				Where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the 
				Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or 
				restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully 
				confined. 
				
				  
				
				
				Court 
				- Holding 
				
				o   
				
				
				The right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so 
				burdened or conditioned. 
				
				  
				
				
				Dissent - Justice Black 
				
				  
				
				
				Broadest kind of leeway 
				
				o   
				
				
				The Equal Protection Clause States are to have the broadest kind 
				of leeway in areas where they have a general constitutional 
				competence to act.  
				
				o   
				
				
				[State] poll tax legislation can "reasonably," "rationally" and 
				without an "invidious" or evil purpose to injure anyone be found 
				to rest on a number of state policies including  
				
				o   
				
				
				(1) the State's desire to collect its revenue, and 
				
				o   
				
				
				(2) its belief that voters who pay a poll tax will be interested 
				in furthering the  State's welfare when they vote.  
				
				  
				
				
				History is on the side of "rationality"  
				
				o   
				
				
				'[And] history is on the side of "rationality" of the State's 
				poll tax policy.  
				
				o   
				
				
				Property qualifications existed in the Colonies and were 
				continued by many States after the Constitution was adopted ....
				 
				
				o   
				
				
				Another reason for my dissent [is that the Court] seems to be 
				using the old "natural-law-due-process formula" to justify 
				striking down state laws as violations of the Equal Protection 
				Clause .... 
				
				  
				
				
				Dissent - Justice Harlan, Justice Stewart 
				
				  
				
				
				Believes there is a rational basis for Virginias poll tax 
				
				o   
				
				
				[The Court uses] captivating phrases, but they are wholly 
				inadequate to satisfy the standard governing adjudication of the 
				equal protection issue: Is there a rational basis for Virginia's 
				poll tax as a voting qualification? I think the answer to that 
				question is undoubtedly "yes." 
				
				  
				
				
				Colony Argument 
				
				o   
				
				
				Property qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional 
				part of our political structure. 
				
				o   
				
				
				 In the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted one.
				 
				
				  
				
				
				Promotes Civic Responsibility 
				
				o   
				
				
				[It] is certainly a rational argument that payment of some 
				minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out 
				those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 
				or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise. 
				 
				
				  
				
				
				People with means are more responsible 
				
				o   
				
				
				It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound 
				political theory by a large percentage of Americans through most 
				of our history, that people with some property have a deeper 
				stake in community affairs, and are consequently more 
				responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of 
				confidence, than those without means, and that the community and 
				Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted 
				to such citizens.  |